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Garcia: Weight-Based Discrimination and the Americans With Disabilities A

WEIGHT-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: IS THERE
AN END IN SIGHT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The existence of various forms of discrimination is far from a recent

development in the United States.1 As society has become more
developed, however, it has made efforts to combat discriminatory
conduct, particularly that which occurs in the work place.2 The most
recent federal legislation enacted to confront discrimination in the work
place is the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").3
Weight-based discrimination in particular, however, has proven to be
elusive in terms of anti-discrimination legislation.4 This Note analyzes
the treatment of weight-based discrimination under both federal and state
legislation and court rulings, identifies the problem with using handicap
discrimination legislation as the basis for a weight-based discrimination
suit, and concludes by proposing a solution whereby overweight individuals can be legally protected.

I. This is evidenced by the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)),
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id.
§ 2000e-2.
2. Id. § 2000e-2.
3. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 329 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
V 1994)). Congress has found that some 43 million Americans who have disabilities are frequently
the victims of discrimination with no legal recourse. Id. § 12101(a)(1), (4). See also CHARLES A.
SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 985-87 (2d ed. 1988).
4. See Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993) (holding that obesity,
without more, is not a "disability" or"handicap"); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Commonwealth, 591 A.2d
281 (Pa. 1991) (holding that in order for obesity to constitute a physical disability, plaintiffs must
show that their obesity either caused, or was caused by, a type of disorder within the meaning of the
state's handicap statute); Greene v. Union Pao. R.R., 548 F.Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (holding
that obesity is not a physical handicap within the contemplation of Washington state law because
it is considered to be alterable and not an immutable or unchangeable condition such as blindness
or lameness).
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II.

BACKGROUND

Modem society tends to view the problem of obesity in both
medical5 and psychological terms.6 But aside from the ridicule and
health problems that overweight individuals may face, there is a prejudice
against the obese in occupational settings. Such treatment restricts obese
individuals from training and employment opportunities in favor of less
qualified but slimmer individuals.7 In essence, obese individuals are
being discriminated against merely because of their appearance, despite
the fact that many of them can satisfactorily perform the duties of the
position that they are seeking. The discriminatory treatment of obese
individuals is often subtle, but the effects can be easily perceived

5. JUDITH A. LEwis ET AL, HEALTH COUNSELING 58 (1993). "Obesity is associated with
higher morbidity as well as with increased mortality, including the greater incidence of diabetes,
bladder disease, orthopedic problems, and complications during surgery." Ide(cihypertension, gall
tations omitted). Obesity has also been associated with medical conditions such as depression,
menstrual disorders, hernias, and several forms of cancer. William E. Straw, M.D., The Dilemma
of Obesity, 72 POSTGRADUATE MED. No. 1, 121, 122 (1982). While the term "obese" generally
indicates that an individual is extremely fat, it is defined as "a condition in which the energy stores
of the body (mainly fat) are too large," BLACK'S MED. DICTIONARY 417 (37th ed. 1992), or "an
abnormal increase of fat in the subcutaneous connective tissues." STEDMAiN'S MED. DICTIONARY
1076 (25th ed. 1990). In any event, morbid obesity is "sufficient to prevent normal activity or
physiologic function, or to cause the onset of a pathologic condition." Ide
6. LEwis, supra note 5. The obese often face a barrage of negative public attitudes and
sentiment and suffer personal indignity. Patricia Hartnett, Note, Nature or Nurture, Lifestyle or
Obese Workers, 24 RUTGERS LJ.807,812 (1993). Obese
Fate.EmploymentDiscriminationAgainst
individuals may be viewed as "wholly 'responsible' for [their] situation, unlike an individual with
another disabling physical attribute.' IL See infra part V.A. An individual's desire to be thin can
lead to severe eating disorders and illnesses such as anorexia nervosa or bulimia, psychological
illnesses that can cause one to lose his or her appetite. Paula B. Stolker, Note, Weigh My Job
Performance,Not My Body: Extending Title VII To Weight-Based Discrimination,10 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTs. 223, 227 (1992).
7. LEwiS, supra note 5. See generally Karol V. Mason, Note, Employment Discrimination
Against the Overweight, 15 U. MICH. .L. REF. 337 (1982). For research indicating that "attractiveness relates to a more positive outcome in terms of employment opportunities, and that obese
individuals experience discriminatory treatment based on their weight," see Stolker, supra note 6,
at 224. See also Esther D. Rothblum et al., The Relationship Between Obesity, Employment Discrimination, and Employment-Related Victimization, 37 J. OF VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 251, 253-54
(1990).
8. See LEwiS, supra note 5, at 58.
9. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. See generally Rothblum, supranote 7, at 251 for
research illustrating the discriminatory treatment faced by the obese in the workplace. "A common
symptom of the bias against overweight people is the use of weight standards to cover subjective
bases for hiring and promoting decisions.... [The use of a] weight control program is one possible
way to harass [employees]." Stolker, supra note 6, at 226. This is particularly common in the
airline industry. See Stolker, supra note 6, at 226.
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1H.

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILTIES ACT OF

1990

Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation
Act")'0 to equalize the employment opportunities for the handicapped"
by prohibiting discrimination in federally funded activities.' 2 Its major
limitation, however, is that discriminatory employment decisions are not
limited to federally funded activities.' 3 By limiting its application to
federally funded programs, the Rehabilitation Act did nothing to protect
disabled individuals who were already in, or trying to enter, the private
sector. 4 Therefore, since the Rehabilitation Act could only protect a
small number of people against discrimination, it emphasized the need
for a "comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."' 5 The result, and the most recent
federal attempt to combat discrimination in the work place, can be found
in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,16 which makes the
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act generally applicable to employment
organizations, joint labor-management committees, and
agencies, labor
7
employers.'

10. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988 & Supp.
V 1994)).
11. Id. § 701.
12. Id. § 794. Section 794 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with
handicaps ... shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance...:' Id. In order to state a cause of action under the Act, it must be
shown:
(1) that the plaintiff is a "handicapped individual" under the terms of the statute; (2) that
the plaintiff is "otherwise qualified" to participate in the program or activity at issue; (3)
that the plaintiff was excluded from the program or activity "solely by reason" of her or
his handicap; and (4) that the program or activity receives federal financial assistance
Plummer v. Branstad, 731 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d
761, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1981)).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
14. Id. § 794.
15. Stolker, supra note 6, at 229.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1994).
17. Id. § 12111(2). The Act applies to all private employers in an industry affecting commerce,
who employ 15 or mare employees. Id. § 12111(5)(A). Congress adopted the definition of the term
"disability" from the Rehabilitation Act definition of"individual with handicaps" so that the relevant
case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act could be generally applicable to the term
"disability" under the ADA. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 at 395 (1994); see SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND HUMAN RSOusCES, MERICANS wnT DiSABiLmES Acr OF 1989, S. REP. No. 116,
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According to the ADA, the term "disability" is defined as having a
record of "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more... major life activities of [an] individual; a record of such
impairment; or [] being regarded as having such an impairment.' 8
Major life activities include functions such as caring for one's self and
working. 9 In an attempt to give the Act the greatest applicability, the
ADA has been drafted to cover both private' and public2 ' employers.
The Act provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, [or] the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees ...

."

The Act further

provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
'
subjected to discrimination by any such entity."23
The Act defines
"qualified individual with a disability" as an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation by aprivateentity "can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires[,]"2 4 or who, with or without reasonable

101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). This definition is substantially similar to that of the
definition of "individual with handicaps" in the Rehabilitation Act: "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B); see also supra note 17. The Rehabilitation Act is further limited in
application, however, by providing a remedy only to those who can prove that their condition results
in a substantial handicap to employment, which can be improved through vocational rehabilitation
services provided pursuant to the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A).
19. The current regulations accompanying the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA define "major
life activities" as "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1994); Regulations to
Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(i) (1994).
20. "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year, and any agent ofsuch person... 2'42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a) (1988 &
Supp. V 1994).
21. "The term 'public entity' means- (A) any State or local government; (B) any department,
agency, special purpose district, orother instrumentality of a State or... local government; and (C)
theNational Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority .... " Id. § 12131(l)(A),
(3).
22. Id. § 12112(a). It is this section that covers private entities.
23. Id § 12132 (emphasis added).
24. Id. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).
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modifications of the rules, policies, or practices of apublic entity "meets
the essential eligibility requirements for the ... participation
in... programs or activities provided by a public entity." s
A.

Congressional Findings and Purposes

Disabled individuals have historically been isolated and segregated
by society by either "outright intentional exclusion"26 or more subtle
practices, including "architectural, transportation, and communication
barriers, ... exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, ... and
relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other
opportunities."27 Such individuals comprise a "discrete and insular
minority" ' who are disadvantaged both socially and economically, who
have faced limitations and restrictions, and have also been "subjected to
a history of purposeful unequal treatment] and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society ...."I As such, disabled individuals have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination,
unlike those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race,
color, sex, national origin, religion, or age.3 Given these findings, the
Congressional mandate in passing the ADA is clear; to invoke a broad
sweep of authority by creating enforceable standards and a central role
for the federal government in the elimination of discrimination against
the disabled.31
B.

Defenses Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

The Act does, however, provide defenses to a charge of discrimination on the basis of disability3 " similar to that of the bona fide occupational qualification of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.?' The

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. § 12131(2) (emphasis added).
Id. § 12101(a)(2).
Id. § 12101(a)(2), (5).
Id. § 12101(a)(7).

29. Id. § 12101(a)(6), (7).

30. Id. § 12101(a)(4).
31. Id. § 12101(b)(l)-(4).
32. Id. § 12113(a).

33. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). The Civil Rights Act of 1964

provides that:

[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
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ADA provides that:
[i]t may be a defense to a charge of discrimination... that an alleged
application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to
an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-relatedand
consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be
accomplished by reasonable accommodation... ?'
Also like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires a valid bona fide
occupational qualification in order for a court to sustain a discriminatory
policy,35 the ADA requires discriminatory policies to be necessary to
the job held or sought 3 6
C. An Expanded Meaning of "Disability"
What is perhaps the greatest effort to implement this national
mandate is the inclusion of those who are regarded as having a disability
'
in the definition of "disability."37
To combat the effects of the erroneous perceptions about the handicapped, this definition of "disability"

such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Civil Rights Act further provides:
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ...on the basis of
his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ....
Id. § 2000e-2(e).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (emphasis added). But see infra part V.B.
35. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that facially neutral height and
weight standards that operated to exclude women from prison guard positions were valid BFOQs in
that they were necessary to the maintenance of control in a maximum security penitentiary); Dripps
v. UPS, 381 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (holding that a company rule of forbidding velders from
wearing beards was a valid BFOQ because it was based on a reasonable concern for safety), aff'd
mem., 515 F.2d 506 (3rd Cir. 1975).
36. E.g., Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (distinguishing between the
legitimate expectations an employer may have under the Rehabilitation Act for jobs requiring unique
qualifications and the mere assumption that certain individuals cannot perform a large class ofjobs);
see infra text accompanying notes 125-43.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). The ' regarded as having language" was also included in the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "to protect people who are denied employment because of an employer's
perceptions, whether or not those perceptions are accurate. It is of little solace to a person denied
employment to know that the employer's view of his or her condition is erroneous." E.E. Black,
Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Haw. 1980) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act
protects those who do not in fact have the condition they are perceived as having, and whose
physical condition does not substantially limit their major life activities). See also supra note 17.
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is meant to "preclude discrimination against '[a] person who has a record

of, or is regarded as having, an impairment [but who] may at present
have no actual incapacity at all.""'3

It is here where many individuals

who have been discriminated against because of their obesity should find
protection, but "[n]either the ADA nor its implementing regulations
specifically address the question of whether obesity is a disability."3' 9

The Act's implementing regulations, however, indicate that an impairment under the Act is a physiological or mental disorder: ° To date,
there has been no definitive ruling as to the disabled status of obese
individuals 4' under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.42
IV.

COURT DECISIONS ON WEIGHT-BASED
DISCRIMINATION

The issue of whether obesity alone is a disability under federal and

similar state legislation is far from settled

3

Most courts that have

considered this question have held that obesity without more is not a

physical disability. 4
According to one author, there are three predominant holdings on

38. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (alteration in original)
(quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,405-06 & n.6 (1979)).
39. Charles T. Passaglia, Appearance Discrimination:The Evidence of the Weight, 23 CoLo.
LAW. 841 (1994).
40. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(l).(2) (1994).
41. This holds true as to obesity being a "disability" in the strictest sense of the term, or even
as a "disability" under the "perceived as having a disability" language of the Act. See Hartnett,
supra note 6, at 818, stating that:
[als a rule, ordinary obesity [(as opposed to excessive or morbid obesity)] is not considered a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.... An obese individual
may, however, claim to have been "regarded as" having a handicap, and, if all other
conditions for pursuing a successful claim are met, the claimant may qualify for protection under the statute.
l-artnett, supra note 6, at 818. But see infra part V.A-B.
42. The appendix to the regulations accompanying the Act, however, indicate that "temporary,
non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are
usually not disabilities.... Similarly, except in rare and limiting circumstances, obesity is not considered a disabling impairment." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 at 396 (1994).
43. See infra part IV.A-C.
44. See infra part IV.A-B. See generally Donald L. Bierman, Jr., Comment, Employment
DiscriminationAgainst Overweight Individuals: Should Obesity be a ProtectedClassification?,30
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 951, 961-64 (1990). Only two states, New York and New Jersey, have held
that obesity is included in their broad statutory definitions of "disability" or "handicap." State Div.
of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985); Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys.,
Inc., 594 A.2d 264 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); see infra text accompanying notes 105-24.
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the weight-based discrimination issue:"s (1) obesity is not a disability;
(2) weight standards are legal if they are bona fide occupational qualifications; and (3) obesity is a disability.46
A. Obesity is Not a Disability
In Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home,4 the court held that a
nurse's aid, who had testified that she was not suffering from a medical
condition in relation to her obesity and that her job performance was not
impaired due to her obesity, was not protected by the state's anti-

discrimination statute. 48 Without analysis, the court held that obesity
without more, is nota physical disability.4 9
In Tudyman v. UnitedAirlines,50 an airline steward was terminated
and his reinstatement was denied because his weight exceeded the
defendant airline's height and weight guidelines."' The steward brought

suit, alleging violation of the Rehabilitation Act for discrimination based
on his inability to meet the airline's weight requirements, yet his
condition was self-imposed as the result of bodybuilding 5 2 Moreover,

the steward's bodybuilding did not cause a limitation in a major life

activity.5 3 Furthermore, because his weight was a self-imposed condition it was, therefore, distinguishable from physiological conditions,
disorders, disfigurement, and anatomical loss.'5 The court held that the
steward was not impaired in any way, 6 and he was not considered to

45. See generally Kimberly B. Dunworth, Note, Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc.: Drawing
the Line At Obesity?, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 523, 531 (1994).
46. Id.
47. 415 N.W.2d 793 (Sup. Ct. N.D. 1987).
48. Id. at 796.
49. Id. The court in Krein adopted the Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971)
definition of "disability" as "a physical or mental illness, injury or condition that hinders, impedes
or incapacitates.' Id.
50. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
51. Id. at 740-41.
52. Id. at 741.
53. Id. at 746.
54. The court noted that his weight was "self-imposed and voluntary," and analogized his
weight to the "voluntary" conditions of drug addiction and alcoholism, of which some individuals
have been specifically excepted from inclusion as protected handicapped individuals under the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. But see infra notes 150, 153, 155 and accompanying text.
55. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.
56. The court noted that he was not in poor shape or overweight at all; in fact, it was his low
percentage of body fat and high percentage of muscle (which weighs more than fat) that resulted in
his weight exceeding the airline's standards. Id. at 741.
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be handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act.57 According to the
Tudyman court, private employers are free to be arbitrary and capricious
in their hiring decisions so long as they do not discriminate in any way
that has been legislatively or judicially prohibited. 58
In Civil Service Commission v. Commonwealth,5 9 a city laborer was
suspended without pay for his failure to lose enough weight to meet the
height and weight standards promulgated for city laborers. 0 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that in order for obesity to constitute
a physical disability within the meaning of the state's handicap statute,
a plaintiff must show that his obesity caused, or was caused by, a type
of disorder specified in the statute.61
One of the most recent cases to rule that obesity alone is not a
disability was Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc.62 In Cassista, a
woman standing at five feet four inches tall and weighing 305 pounds
applied for a job in a health food store.63 The position involved
running the cash register, stocking produce and food items, and lifting
and carrying groceries around the store.' Cassista was not hired for the
position, nor for other openings for which she subsequently reapplied. 65
The defendant was concerned that she couldn't physically do the work
required by the position because of her weight,66 despite the fact she
stated that she had no physical limitations which would interfere with her
ability to do the job. 67 According to a defense expert, the worksite
would be a hazard for an individual of her weight because of the narrow
aisles in the store and the danger that the ladders and stepstools would
not support her weight! 8 All of the members of the hiring committee,
however, testified that Cassista's weight played no part in the decision

57. Id. at 746-47.
58. Id. at 747. Moreover, the inability to attain a single job because ofa perceived impairment
does not make that individual "handicapped." Id. at 745.
59. 591 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
60. Id. at 282.

61. Id. at 283-84. See also Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Sup. Ct. Cal.
1993) (holding that weight, unrelated to physiological or systematic disorder as set forth in the disability statute, does not constitute a handicap or disability within the meaning of that statute);
Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (noting that obesity, without more, was probably not a handicap).
62. 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993).
63. Id. at 1144.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 1145.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 1146.
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not to hire her.69
The California Supreme Court favorably discussed the opinion of a
federal district court 7 that held that "to the extent that obesity is a
transitory or self-imposed condition resulting from an individual's voluntary action or inaction, it Would be neither a physiological disorder nor
a handicap."' And in a narrow reading of the relevant state disability
statute, the court concluded that obesity, without more, was not a
"disability" or "handicap" within the meaning of the statute.72 In
essence, because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that her excess
weight was caused by or, in turn, caused a physiological disorder within
the meaning of the statute, she failed to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination based on a disability.73
Similarly, in Greene v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 4 a man was
denied a transfer to a physically demanding job because he was
overweight, had high blood pressure, and advanced osteoarthritis of the
spine. 5 The defendant railroad's justification was that these conditions
made the plaintiff less apt to be an efficient and safe employee and more
likely to claim more insurance benefits than an employee without similar
physical conditions.7 6 The court held that the height and weight
requirements of the railroad were valid bona fide occupational qualifications' and that the railroad was under a duty to consider the impact
of his condition on his ability to perform the job with sufficient safety
towards himself, as well as to other employees and the public at large.7
Finally, in considering whether obesity was a handicap under the relevant
state statute, the court ruled that no handicap was present because obesity
is alterable, and not an "immutable or unchangeable condition such as

69.
70.
F.3d 17
71.

Id.
Id. at 1152 (citing Cook v. Rhode Island, 783 F. Supp. 1569, 1573 (D.R.L 1992), aJt'd, 10
(1st Cir. 1993)).
Id. (quoting Cook 783 F.Supp. at 1573; and citing Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 739). But

see Cook, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting the lower Cook court's ruling on this point, noting
that the Rehabilitation Act's protections are not necessarily tied to the manner in which an individual
became disabled). See infra text accompanying notes 125-43.
72. Cassista,856 P.2d at 1154.

73. Id.
74. 548 F. Supp. 3 (,V.D. Wash. 1981).
75. Id. at 5.

76. Id.
77. For additional cases discussing bona fide occupational qualifications in the context of
weight, see infra part IV.B.
78. Greene, 548 F. Supp. at 5. According to the court, however, whether a bona fide occupational qualification exists will generally depend on the specific facts and circumstances of each
case. Id. at 4.
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blindness or lameness." 79
In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Commonwealth,"0 a woman
weighing 341 pounds and standing five feet eight inches tall underwent
a physical examination after successfully passing preemployment
testing.8" She was classified by the company's doctor as unsuitable for
employment as a customer service person" because her weight significantly exceeded the desirable weight of 140 pounds according to the
height and weight charts used by the company. 2 The commission held
that her morbid obesity was a handicap within the meaning of the state
act83 and that the condition did not interfere with the plaintiffs ability
to perform the job she sought! 4 The appellate court reversed the
finding of unlawful discrimination and held that morbid obesity alone
was not a handicap or disability within the meaning of the state
statute."5 The court reasoned that since the doctor had found nothing
physically wrong with the plaintiff, there was nothing to prevent her
from performing her duties.8 6 Furthermore, since her obesity did not
impair her job performance in any way, it was not a job related
handicap." According to the court, obesity alone did not constitute a
handicap within the meaning of the statute, nor was there "even a scintilla of evidence ' ' that the plaintiff was in fact handicapped or disabled
in any manner.89 The court further held that "an employer may be
selective about the persons he employs as long as he does not unlawfully
discriminate against the applicants." 90 The court emphasized that:
[Not all discrimination is unlawful. An employer who refuses to hire
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 5.
448 A.2d 701 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 703.
Human Relations Act, 1955 Pa. Legis. Serv. 744 (Purdon), (codified as amended at43 P.S.

§§ 951-63).
84. PhiladelphiaElec. Co., 448 A.2d at 703.
85. Id. at 707. It is important to note, however, that while the relevant state statute was similar
to the federal Rehabilitation Act, it did not include the "perceived as having a handicap" language.
Id. at 703-04, 708. See also Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
699 S.V.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that obesity alone is probably not a handicap under
state law); Greene v. Union Pac. R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3 (holding that the obese plaintiff was not
handicapped within the contemplation of the Washington state statutes).
86. PhiladelphiaElec. Co., 448 A.2d at 704. Moreover, the plaintiff herself did not believe
that her weight would prevent her from performing her duties. Id. at 707.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 708.
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someone solely because that person fails pre-employment tests is
discriminating against that person, but not unlawfully.... [A]a
employer has the inherent right to discriminate among applicants for
employment and to eliminate those who have a high potential for
absenteeism and low productivity."
Thus, as one commentator has stated, "lawful discrimination can only
occur when the policy, procedure, or practice is applied'uniformly and
reasonably.""2
B.

Weight Standards and Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications

In Lipton v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board,93 a
woman who was five feet seven inches tall, weighed over 300 pounds,
and had high blood pressure was denied reemployment because her

obesity had previously hindered her job performance, and was likely to
do so in the future.94 Because her obese condition was directly related
to her ability to perform her job efficiently, the court held that her
employer had not discriminated against her on the basis of a disability. 5
Similarly, in Velger v. Wrilliams,96 an obese man alleging that he

was discharged from his probationary position as a hazardous waste
investigator because of his weight was unsuccessful in making a claim

under a state disability statute.97 According to that court, "an employer
is not guilty of unlawful discrimination against a person with a physical
impairment if that person's condition is 'in any way related to the duties
98
the person was required to perform in connection with [his] position'."

91. Id. (citing Metropolitan Dade County v. Wolf, 274 So.2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(holding that "weight regulations [were] grounded on business necessity and compliance therewith
may be made a condition of employment due to the likelihood that an obese person will become
disabled during employment." Id. n.10), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973).
92. Bierman, supra note 44, at 963.
93. 413 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
94. Id. at 233-34.
95. Id. The court also stated that the appeals board should ' restrict its intervention to cases in
which the alleged discrimination is unrelated to the nature of the employment." Id. See also
Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that a trucking company's blanket policy of excluding all persons with back problems from
employment violated the relevant state employment discrimination statute). The Sterling court also
noted that the BFOQ defense only relates to whether a handicapped individual is unable to presently
perform the job duties safely and efficiently. Id. at 550.
96. 500 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
97. Id. at 412.
98. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Miller v. Ravitch, 458 N.E.2d 1235, 1236 (N.Y. 1983)).
See also Parolisi v. Board of Examiners, 285 N.Y.S.2d 936 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (holding that the school
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This case serves as an example of the "catch-22

99

situation in that

unless the "weight condition has interfered with or precluded adequate
job performance, it has not been considered to be a qualified
handicap."1 '
In McMillen v. Civil Service Commission,0 1 when the Los An-

geles City Fire Department disciplined an ambulance driver for failing to
meet the body weight standards of the department, the driver charged the

fire department with discrimination on the basis of a physical disability
even though he did not feel that his weight hindered his job perfor-

mance."t 2 The court held that because of the strenuous activities that
an ambulance driver may have to endure, the department's weight
standards were reasonable "as a means of ensuring the safety of its
employees and members of the public."' °3 Furthermore, "[e]mployee

board's speculation that a teacher could not perform her duties because she was obese was arbitrary
and capricious); Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 50 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1698 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that the defendant airline's weight policy,
which applied different standards for men than for women, perpetuated sexual stereotypes and that
the defendant failed to prove that the weight standard was a bona fide occupational qualification
necessary to perform the job and ensure passenger safety within the meaning of the Civil Rights
Act); Diaz v. Pan An. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that requiring
flight attendants to be women was not a valid bona fide occupational qualification under the Civil
Rights Act), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.
1971) (holding that an airline's "no.marriage" rule for stewardesses was an invalid bona fide
occupational qualification under the Civil Rights Act), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
99. This "damned ifyou do, damned if you don't' scenario can present itself in the following
ways: a court can construe the term "handicap" so as to require an actual handicap, thus, barring
relief for obese individuals who are not, in fact, physically impaired; or a court may consider a plaintiff unfit for a particular job if the plaintiff argues that she is impaired due to her obesity. Hartnett,
supra note 6, at 842. As the Tudyman court described it, "the plaintiff must first show that he or
she has some impairment which substantially limits a major life activity, but this same plaintiff must
show that he or she is not so handicapped as to be unable to perform the job." Tudyman v. United
Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Hartnett suggests that it is for this reason that the
"handicap" strategy is unreliable and inappropriate in obesity cases. Hartnett, supra note 6 at 842.
This view, however, fails to take into account the very basis for the "regarded as having a disability"
language of the ADA, to prevent those who do not in fact have a disability from being discriminated
against because of the erroneous impression that they have an impairment. See infra notes 172-73
and accompanying text.
100. Bierman, supra note 44, at 963 & n.89.
101. 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
102. See id. at 549-50.
103. Id. at 551. See also Louisville Black Police Officers Org. v. Louisville, 511 F. Supp. 825,
840-41 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (holding that potential police recruits were rejected for employment because
they failed legitimate, non-discriminatory physical and stress tests rather than because of their
obesity), affid, 700 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506 (D.NJ. 1986)
(holding that a mandatory retirement age was a bona fide occupational qualification in light of the
fact that the continued health and fitness of the state police was essential to the safe and efficient
performance of law enforcement duties), alld, 815 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1987).
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height and weight limitations may be prescribed by an employer where
there is a rational basis for such limitations, as shown by supportive
analytical factual data rather than stereotypical generalizations."" °4
C.

Obesity is a Disability

As stated above, few cases have held that obesity, without more, is
a disability. In State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp.,l s the
complainant, a five feet six inch tall woman of 249 pounds, received an
offer of employment contingent upon her satisfactorily passing a
preemployment medical examination." 6 The complainant failed the
07
medical exam and was refused employment because she was obese.1
The defendant company required all applicants to take a preemployment
medical examination, and the complainant's examination revealed no
other medical conditions other than her obesity.' 8 The examining
physician concluded that the complainant was not medically acceptable
for employment as a systems consultant solely because she was
obese." 9 The defendant did not dispute in any way that she was
qualified for the position and acknowledged that her condition was
completely unrelated to her ability to perform her duties as a systems
consultant."0 The defendant argued, however, that obese individuals

104. McMillen, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d at 550 (citing Hardy v. Stumpf, 112 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974)). See also Hegwer v. Board of Civil Serv. Comm'rs, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(affirming the suspension of an obese paramedic who suffered from a thyroid condition which
contributed to an obesity problem because the Fire Department's weight standards were based upon
a bona fide occupational qualification). In Hegwer, the fire department imposed weight limits on
its firefighters and paramedics as a part of an overall physical fitness program. Hegwer, 7 Cal. Rptr.
at 391. The plaintiff, however, consistently failed to achieve her weight goals as required by the
program and was suspended numerous times. Idat 392-93. Although the plaintiff's level of fitness
was classified as "very poor," the Hegwer court held that the weight standard was not arbitrary due
to the nature of a paramedic's work. Id. at 396. According to the court, "'s]trength, endurance,
agility and speed are essential to the safe and efficient performance of' a paramedic's duties. Id.
(emphasis added). See also Blodgett v. Board of Trustees, 97 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Cal. C. App. 1971)
(noting that it was unnecessary for a probationary physical education teacher, an obese woman
whose contract was not renewed due to her obesity, to excel during in-class demonstrations to be
an effective, capable, and competent teacher).
105. 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985).
106. Id. at 696.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. She was characterized by the Director of Health Services as having the disease of
"active gross obesity." Id.
110. State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 478 N.Y.S.2d 982, 983 (App. Div. 1984),
aFid,480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985).
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as a group would be more costly because 'over the long term the obese
group [would] have a higher absenteeism rate, higher utilization rate of
long-term and disability benefits, medical care plans, [and] life insurance."'111 According to the New York Court of Appeals, "the statute

protects all persons with disabilities and not just those with hopeless [and
immutable] conditions.""

The court held that her obesity fell into the
statutory definition in that it was clinically diagnosed by the defendant's

own physician, and rejected the argument that the statute should apply
only to immutable disabilities.'
Thus, the court affirmed the findings
of the court below, which held that the complainant's gross obesity in itself was a physical or medical impairment, that it prevented the exercise

of normal bodily function or was "demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical or laboratory techniques," and that it was an accepted fact that

obesity limits an individual's physical agility and endurance.114 What
is perhaps most important about this particular case is that the court
concluded that the obesity was a "medical" and "physical" impairment
within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights Law, which
the legislature had mandated to be liberally interpreted to accomplish its

purpose."'

The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the finding

that the complainant had been discriminated against, and added that
"employment [could] not be denied because of any actual or perceived

undesirable effect the person's employment [might] have on disability or
life insurance programs." '

6

As was stated in PhiladelphiaElectric:

every applicant for employment has some potential for handicap or
I 11. Xerox Corp., 478 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
112. Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 698. New York State's Human Rights Law defines "disability" more
broadly than statutes that track the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. The court noted that disabilities "are not limited to physical or mental impairments but may also include 'medical' impairments.... [rio qualify as a disability, the condition may manifest itself... by preventing the
exercise of a normal bodily function or by being 'demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques':' Id. The court read the statute as covering a variety of conditions, from the "loss ofa bodily function to those which are merely diagnosable medical anomalies
which impair bodily integrity and thus may lead to more serious conditions in the future:' Id.
113. Id.
114. Xerox, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 985, aff'd, 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985).
115. Id. at 986. The court reasoned that since the statute would protect an obese person who
also had high blood pressure, the statute should be construed to protect an obese person who had
no other medical condition or impairments. Id.
116. Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 697. Moreover, the court held that an employer could not deny
employment simply because a condition has been detected that may potentially have undesirable
effects. Id. at 698. But see Metropolitan Dade County v. Wolf,274 So.2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973) (holding that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that an individual who is obese or overweight is more likely to become disabled during employment), cart.denied,414 U.S. 1116 (1973).
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disability and to use any criteria other than the applicant's present
condition for a determination of whether or not that person is handicapped or disabled would be to transfer the language of [the disability
statute] into a universal discrimination law.17
In Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Systems,"' an office manager
was allegedly fired due to his obesity." 9 His employment records
included several commendations for his job performance and his office's
high performance, indications that his obesity did not affect his job. 2 '
Therefore, the record supported the conclusion that he was "perceived as
having" a disability in that his obesity was considered to be a defect, and
that it did not disqualify him in any way from his particular position or
his career path.'
The court concluded that he had shown that his
obesity constituted a physical "handicap" within the meaning of the state
disability statute"2 because he had sought medical treatment for his
obesity." The court, however, appears to have limited its holding to
the facts of this particular case, noting that the lower court did not
specifically address the issue of whether obesity was a disability in every
case. 124

Cook v. Rhode Island"5 is particularly important, for it represents
the first time that a federal court refused to dismiss a claim that obesity,
without more, may be an actual or "perceived" handicap within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 126 In Cook, the plaintiff worked as
an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded for eight years, during
which she was overweight."' She had two periods of employment as

117. 448 A.2d at 707-08.
118. 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
119. Id. at 265.
120. Id. at 267.

121. Id. at 273.
122. Law Against Discrimination, NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (Vest 1993).

123. Giniello, 594 A.2d at 273. The court held that the state's broad definition of handicap
included a condition that was demonstrable by accepted diagnostic techniques, and that his obesity
was undisputedly such a condition. Id. at 276.
124. Id. at 272-73. The court based its holding on the fact that the employer fired him because
of a medically demonstrable condition covered by the broad language of the statute, a condition
which did not prevent him from doing his job. Id. at 278. For this reason alone, the termination
constituted employment discrimination based on a handicap and was actionable. Id. Thus, it did
not matter whether the plaintiff's obesity was a real or perceived handicap because he had a
recognized medical condition for which he sought legitimate treatment, and the defendants were
liable. Id. at 273, 278.
125. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
126. See i.
127. Id. at 20-21 & n.l.
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an attendant, during which she'maintained an unblemished performance
record. 2 8 It is not clear why her employment was terminated in 1988,
but when she sought reemployment she was refused partly because her
employer claimed that her obesity impaired her ability to evacuate
patients in an emergency.1 29 At the time she reapplied, she was five
feet two inches tall and weighed over 320 pounds.
She had been
accepted for employment, on the condition that she satisfactorily
complete a physical examination.'
Although she passed the physical,
the examining physician refused to approve her hire unless she reduced
her weight to something less than 300 pounds.3 2 When she failed to
satisfy this requirement, she was denied employment, and she filed suit
33
under the Rehabilitation Act.
Cook argued that she was discriminated against because her
employer "perceived" her obesity to be a disability.'34 In analyzing the
interpretive regulations of the Rehabilitation Act, the First Circuit noted
that the enumerated disorders in the Act "are open-ended... [and] do
not purport to 'set forth [an exclusive] list of specific diseases and conditions.., because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of
any such list."" 35 Therefore, the defendant essentially conceded that
the plaintiff was not hired solely because of her weight.'36
On appeal, the defendant argued that a condition cannot be an
impairment unless it is an immutable condition that is beyond a person's
control, the lack of which would bring the condition outside the scope of
the Rehabilitation Act.'37 The court, however, concluded that "[s]o
long as the prospective employer regards the condition as immutable, no

128. Id. at 20.
129. Id. at 21. The defendant employer also claimed that her obesity put her at risk of
contracting more serious ailments, which would result in increased absenteeism and workers'
compensation claims. Id.
130. Id. at 20.
131. Cook v. Rhode Island, 783 F.Supp. 1569, 1571 (D.R.T. 1992), affd, 10 F.3d 17 (Ist Cir.

1993).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1570-71.
134. Cook, I0F.3d at 22.

135. Id. at 22-23 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.30()(2)(i)(A) app. at 377 (1992), amended by app. at
355 (1994)). The court noted that the employer's own expert physician held the opinion that
"morbid obesity affects virtually every [body] system, including cardiovascular, immune, musculoskeletal, and sensory systems:' Id.
at 23 n.6 (alteration in original).
136. See id. at 21 n.3, 27.
137. Id. at 24. The court's holding, however, was based on the fact that the employer perceived
Cook to be disabled. Id.
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more is exigible.' 3'
The court further held that the Rehabilitation
Act's protections are not necessarily linked to how someone becomes
disabled. 39 Moreover, the employer relied on "generalizations regarding an obese person's capabilities," including a fear that the plaintiff
would suffer a work-related injury.'
Thus, all of the evidence,
including the medical examination which she would have passed but for
her obesity, demonstrated that Cook was definitely qualified for the
position and could perform the job satisfactorily. 4 ' The potential force
of this opinion for obese individuals can be seen from the following
excerpt: "in a society that all too often confuses 'slim' with 'beautiful'
or 'good,' morbid obesity can present formidable barriers to employment.
Where, as here, the barriers transgress federal law, those who erect and
seek to preserve them must suffer the consequences."' 42 Although the
Cook decision appears to be limited to cases of morbid obesity, it is still
a significant ruling and persuasive authority for "perceived disability"
claims under the ADA. 143
These cases clearly show a lack of any definable standard in the
obesity discrimination field, further stressing the importance for a
uniform standard for determining when obesity will constitute a
disability. As one commentator notes, even cases including "obesity
within statutory protections.., do not present a common pattern of
reasoning... [Thus, o]besity discrimination remains a fluctuating and
non-cohesive area of law."'"
Such inconsistent reasoning clearly
emphasizes the need for one definitive standard and an explicit prohibition against weight-based discrimination.

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 27. Equally important to the court, was the distinction between the legitimate
expectations that an employer may have for jobs requiring unique qualifications (such as fire fighters, police officers, and airline stewards) and the mere assumption that an employee cannot perform
a large class ofjobs simply because of a generalized perception ofa condition. Id. at 26. According
to the court, one need not have been rejected from many jobs, but need only to show that an
employer substantially limited a major life activity by foreclosing a "sufficiently wide range ofjobs."
Id. at 25-26. In essence:
[D]enying an applicant even a single job that requires no unique physical skills, due
solely to the perception that the applicant suffers from a physical limitations (sic] that
would keep her from qualifying for a broad spectrum ofjobs, can constitute treating an
applicant as if her condition substantially limited a major life activity, viz., working.
Id.at 26.
141. Id. at 26-27.
142. Id. at 28.
143. Passaglia, supra note 39, at 842-43.
144. Dunworth, supra note 45, at 537.
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OBESITY UNDER THE AMEwRICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

As stated above, neither the ADA, its implementing regulations, nor
federal case law, specifically addresses the issue of whether obesity,
without more, is a disability. 4 s Without such a definitive standard
against weight-based discrimination, however, the ADA falls short of
protecting overweight individuals.

A. A Condition Due to a Voluntary Act of the Individual Claiming
to be Disabled
An argument against protecting obese individuals through disability

statutes is that the obese are not entitled to protection because the term
"disability" should not include physical conditions that result from the
voluntary acts of an individual.'6 According to this argument, a selfimposed condition that is the result of voluntary conduct (in this case,
overeating) is neither a physiological disorder nor a handicap and, thus,

should receive no protection. 47
In addressing this issue, there has been a tendency by courts to

require an individual's condition to be immutable in order for statutory
protections against discrimination to apply.'48 For instance, the Greene
court held that a handicap was not present because obesity was
considered to be alterable and not an immutable or unchangeable
condition.'4 9 The Tudyman court, on the other hand, discussed the issue further by analogizing the condition of being overweight to other

145. Passaglia, supra note 39, at 841. See supra part 111.C.
146. See Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d at 1152 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Cook v.
Rhode Island, 783 F. Supp. at 1573 (D.R.I. 1992) ("to the extent that obesity is a transitory or selfimposed condition resulting from an individual's voluntary action or inaction, it would be neither
a physiological disorder nor a handicap.") aff'd, 10 F.3d 17 (Ist Cir. 1993) (affirming the lower
court's ruling but rejecting the notion that immutability is required)). See also Greene v. Union Pao.
R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (holding that obesity is not a physical handicap within the
contemplation of Washington state law because it is "not an immutable condition such as blindness
or lameness'); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that the
plaintiff's weight was "self-imposed and voluntary" and, as such, it was distinguishable from physiological disorders, disfigurement, and anatomical loss).
147. See supra note 146.
148. See supra note 146.
149. Greene, 548 F. Supp. 3 (V.D. Wash. 1981). But see Cook, 10 F.3d 17 (Ist Cir. 1993)
(rejecting the argument that immutability is required for the Rehabilitation Act to apply); Xerox, 480
N.E2d 695 (N.Y. 1985) (rejecting the argument that the relevant state statute should apply only to
immutable conditions).
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voluntary conditions that are excepted from inclusion as "disabilities" by
the Rehabilitation Act in certain circumstances. 5 ' The major factor
here was that the condition was self-imposed and voluntary.'

The

New York Court of Appeals is the only state court to hold that such a
statute protects all persons with disabilities, and not just those with hopeless or immutable conditions. 52 In addition, the Cook court is the only
federal court to hold that protection under the Rehabilitation Act is not
necessarily linked to how an individual became disabled or whether an
individual contributed to an impairment. 53 In most cases, however,

excess weight, without a related medical condition or other impairment,
has not been considered a handicap."
The immutability argument is short-sighted for a number of reasons.
Obesity is often considered to be a voluntary indulgence, but being
overweight is simply not the result of overeating and nothing more. 5 '
Factors such as heredity, socioeconomic status, gender, and race can
influence an individual's body weight. 156 In fact, researchers have
consistently found that the obese cannot control their body weight.5 7
Thus, obesity may in fact be immutable for some overweight individuals.

150. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(7)(B), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. V 1994) (defining "individual with a
disability" but eliminating the exceptions of alcoholism and drug abuse)). Drug addicts and
alcoholics are excepted from inclusion as protected individuals in certain circumstances. See id.; 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(E)(iii). The ADA includes a similar provision at 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a).
151. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.
152. Xerox, 480 N.E.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. 1985).
153. Cook, 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1993). "On the contraly, the Act indisputably applies to
numerous conditions that may be caused or exacerbated by voluntary conduct, such as alcoholism,
AIDS, diabetes, [and] cancer resulting from cigarette smoking ..."'Id. But see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12114(a), 12208, 12210(a), and 21211 of the ADA, which excludes, among other things, transvestites, people with sexual disorders such as pedophiles, gamblers, and illegal drug users from its
protection.
154. E.g. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1143, 1152.
155. Dunworth, supra note 45, at 544-45. The obese may be viewed as being responsible for
their situation, "unlike an individual with another disabling physical attribute." Hartnett, supra note
6, at 812. There is "no single explanation for its causes. [But to conclude that obesity is caused
by overeating is no more meaningful than concluding that alcoholism is caused by too much drinking." Hartnett, supra note 6, at 810. See also Jane Osbome Baker, Comment, The Rehabilitation
Act of1973: Protectionfor Victims of Weight Discrimination?,29 UCLA L. REV. 947, 952 (1982).
156. Dunworth,supranote 45, at 544-45; see Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Social and Economic
Consequences of Overweight In Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 329 NSIV ENG.L MED. 1008,
1008-12 (1993); see also Baker, supra note 155, at 949, 952.
157. Dunworth, supra note 45 at 545.
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B.

Meeting All Job Requirements But Failing a Physical
Examination Because of Obesity

Employers often use the results of preemployment testing in hiring
decisions, but such testing can create situations in which obese individuals who are capable of performing the duties required by the position
being applied for are being denied employment because they are found
In this respect, the
to be medically unfit due to their obesity.'5
business necessity exception to many disability statutes may serve as "a
pretext for prejudice or to disguise unsubstantiated fear[s] that' 'obese
159
employees will be less likely to be 'illness-free' or 'claims-free.
The ADA, however, provides protection for job applicants from
employers who try to screen out individuals because of disabilities." °
Under the ADA the term "discriminate" with regard to a private employer includes:
using qualification standards,' employment tests, or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test
or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be
job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business
necessity ... 162
The ADA further provides that employers are prohibited from administering medical examinations to screen job applicants and to inquire as to the
existence of a disability unless an applicant will be unable to perform the
duties of the position sought because of a physical infirmity. 63 An
employer can, however, inquire as to an applicant's ability to perform

158. Xerox, 480N.E.2d 695,698 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that plaintiff was handicapped in that she
was found to be medically unacceptable by a potential employer due solely to her obesity); see also
Velger v. Williams, 500 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that an employer is not guilty

ofunlawful discrimination against an obese person if the condition is in any way related to the duties
required of the person in connection with the position); Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.,
594 A.2d 264 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1991) (holding that an employee was a victim of discrimination
when he was fired because of his obesity, which his supervisors perceived as a defect but which did

not disqualify him from his job).
159. See Hartnett, supra note 6, at 829.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
161. "Qualification standard" can include a requirement that an "individual shall not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace:' Id. § 12113(b).

162. Id.
§ 12112(b)(6).
163. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
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job-related functions." Preemployment examinations are also subject
to several restrictions.16 An employer may administer such exams if
they are job related,'" if all employees are required to take such an exam,16 7 and if the information that is obtained is kept confidential. 68
There is still one problem, however, in that the subjective nature of such
examinations enables employers to make evaluations as to an applicant's
fitness for a particular job when such medical judgments are made
without regard to any specific physical job requirement.'6 9
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act's Broad, Yet Limited,
Definition of "Disability"
While the "perceived as having" terminology of the ADA may seem
incredibly broad, its protections may still fall prey to the same fluctuation
and non-cohesiveness with regard to what constitutes a "disability."'7 0
The United States Supreme Court has held that an otherwise qualified
individual "'is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements
in spite of [the] handicap." m 7 It is language such as this which seems
to protect obese individuals, but it is the issue of what constitutes a
"disability" that works against them.
The ADA not only includes those "who are actually.., impaired,
but also those who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are
substantially limited in a major life activity... [due to]
society's ... myths and fears about disabilit[ies,] ... [which] are as
handicapping as are the.., limitations that flow from actual impair-

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

12112(d)(4)(B).
12112(d).
12112(d)(2)(B).
12112(d)(3)(A).

168. Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B). Provided that "(i) supervisors and managers may be informed
regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations... !' Id.
169. Hartnett, supra note 6, at 830. "In the Greene railroad case, for example, the court implied
that a legitimate business concern existed regarding the 'overall fitness' of the obese employee and

fear that the employee would not be 'illness-free, and claims-free."' Hartnett, supra note 6, at 830;
Greene v. Union Pao. R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981). But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that a bona fide occupational qualification under the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is to be interpreted narrowly). This, however, does not seem to be the case concerning weightbased employment decisions.
170. See supra part IV.
171. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,287 n.17 (1987) (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979)).
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The effects of one's impairment "on others is as relevant to

[the] determination of whether one is handicapped as is the" intrinsic or

physical effect the condition has on the handicapped individual.'73
Although not every applicant rejected because of a job requirement is
handicapped within the meaning of the ADA, the substantial limitation
in obtaining a career goal because of an impairment does make an
applicant handicapped. 74
Although applicants may be excluded for failing to prove that they

can engage in the activity despite their handicap," 5 "[e]ven in applying
permissible standards, officers of a [s]tate cannot exclude an applicant
when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet [their] stan-

dards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.

76

While the

"regarded as having" language seems to make the definition of "disability" broad, the Act leaves unanswered several questions that greatly re-

stricts its application to weight-based discrimination. The Act fails to

172. Id. at 284. "Congress' desire to prohibit discrimination based on the effects a person's
handicap may have on others was evident from the inception of the Act.' Id. at 282 n.9.
173. Id. at 283 n.10; Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. CV. 87-2514 PAR, 1988 WL 81776, at *6 &
n.6 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988). This is clearly supported by the legislative history of the ADA,
which states that being regarded as having an impairment "also includes an individual who has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major activities only as a result of the
attitudes of others toward such impairment[,] or [who] has no physical or mental impairment but is
treated by a covered entity as having such an impairment." SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN
REsouRcEs, AhmiCANS %vrr DISABtLrEs Acr oF 1989, S. RE. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
23 (1989). According to the Senate report, an individual would be covered under the "regarded as
having" prong of the ADA if an employer refuses to hire an individual simply because of a fear of
the negative reactions of others, or the employer's perception that the individual had a disability that
prevented her from working. Id. at 24 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 284; CentinelaHosp., No. CV. 872514 PAR, 1988 WL 81776 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988)).
174. See Taylor v. United States Postal Serv., 946 F.2d 1214,1217-18 (6th Cir. 1991). See also
Cook, 783 F. Supp. at 1575, (noting that the Rehabilitation Act does not require hiring an individual
who cannot satisfactorily perform the job because such inability stems from a handicap), affd, 10
F.3d 17 (Ist Cir. 1993). According to the lower Cook court, the individual's rejection must be
solely, and by reason of,such handicap to establish a claim of handicap discrimination. Id.at 157576 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988); Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 731, 744 (D.R.I. 1984)).
Likewise, the implementing regulations accompanying the ADA state that the "inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
175. See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981) (reversing the grant of a
preliminary injunction where the plaintiff medical student failed to establish a substantial likelihood
of success an the merits - that she was qualified for acceptance as a medical student or qualified
to engage in the practice of medicine despite her handicap).
176. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). Similarly, private
employers cannot impose qualification standards that tend to screen out, or have the effect of screening out, "undesired" individuals unless such standards are job-related in terms of the position sought
and are consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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specifically include obesity as a "handicap," which, in turn, makes it
difficult to determine whether obesity in itself is a "disability.""'
Without such an inclusion, it is difficult to determine whether obesity can
substantially limit a major life activity within the meaning of the Act.
More importantly, the Act leaves unanswered the question of whether the
perception of having such a limiting condition would entitle an obese
individual to protection under the Act.'
VI. How OBESITY SHOULD BE TREATED UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Without more aggressive action, discrimination against the obese
will continue. States that have enacted disability discrimination statutes
have not included obesity in the definition of "handicap."'1 9 Michigan
is the only state that has explicitly prohibited discrimination on the basis
of weight.'
Moreover, most courts have been reluctant to hold that
obesity, in itself, is a handicap.'' Only New York in Xerox'2 has
held that obesity alone was enough to consider an individual handicapped
for anti-discrimination purposes." As one commentator has noted:

177. The result is the use of inconsistent standards to determine whether an obese individual is
"handicapped!' See supra parts II.C.-v.C.
178. This would clearly appear to be consistent with Arlne, 480 U.S. 273, in that a person who
is discriminated against because ofnegative attitudes is treated as being currently disabled and is also
entitled to the protection of the Act, which makes such discrimination illegal. In essence, obesity
alone should be enough to consider an individual disabled in those situations where an employer
erroneously perceives an individual's capabilities to be limited merely because of his or her obesity.
179. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted such legislation prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability or handicap. A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMtNATON, Vol. 3A § 107.31 at 22-118 (1995 & Supp. 1995).
180. Micu. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2102 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995). Michigan has also added
height to the standard protected classes in its civil rights statute (religion, race, color, national origin,
age, sex, and marital status). Id. The District of Columbia has not addressed the issue specifically,
but does prohibit discrimination on the basis of personal appearance. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501
(1981 & Supp. 1995). At one point, California had specifically excluded obesity from the definition
of "handicap" in its government code, which applies to the California Civil Service System; that
reference has since been deleted. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 19702(c) (West 1995) (historical and
statutory notes).
181. See generally Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 448 A.2d 701 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1982) (rejecting the notion that the fact of being morbidly obese alone made an individual handicapped).
182. 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985).
183. Id. at 697. Other courts, however, have required obesity to be accompanied by other
physiological conditions or impairments before it could be considered a handicap. Bierman, supra
note 44, at 961. Without such other medical or physical conditions, these courts have defined
"handicap" or "disability" narrowly, such that the overweight condition does not constitute a
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It appears to stretch the definition of handicap to include someone who
is in good health and able to perform job functions satisfactorily, but
is overweight. The first two levels of obesity overweight 184 and
significant obesity,' do not appear to adversely affect performance.
Even morbid obesity' 16 does not, by itself, necessarily have a
negative impact on an individual's job performance. Additionally, most
overweight persons would not consider themselves to be handicapped
under common notions, definitions and perceptions of the term handicapped. The self-perception of being handicapped, for many obese
persons, probably occurs while searching for a remedy after discrimination has occurred.'s
But in order to combat this form of discrimination, we must change the
definition of disability in the ADA to clearly include those who are obese

either through federal legislation, or statutory interpretation by creating
an exception (or addition) to the general definition. Such a change
would make it unlawful for any employer to use weight as a factor in the
hiring process, unless of course, an obese individual cannot adequately
perform the duties of the position even after reasonable accommodation
by the employer. 188 What is most important, however, is that the

federal government makes this change so that the "Congressional
mandate"'8 9 can be carried out through one uniform and enforceable

standard. Current standards throughout the country for determining
whether obese individuals are "handicapped" are simply insufficient to
protect the overweight.19

As one commentator has noted in response

handicap. Bierman, supra note 44, at 969. For cases holding that obesity, without more, is not a
disability, see Cassista,856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993); Civil Sere. Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991);
Krein, 415 NAV.2d 793 (N.D. 1987).
184. Defined as "any weight exceeding the ideal weight defined in tables published by insurance
companies ....Individuals in this category of obesity would probably not be considered fat or obese
by the non-medical community." Bierman, supra note 44, at 956.
185. "[W]hen a person is 20% [to 30%] above the ideal weight [it] ...is referred to as
medically significant obesity.... [This] person would be considered fat by a non-medical persofi:'
Bierman, supra note 44, at 956.
186. "Morbid obesity is weight that is either one hundred pounds over the ideal, or twice the
ideal." Bierman, supra note 44, at 957.
187. Bierman, supra note 44, at 969-70. 188. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
189. See supra part III.A.
190. See Cassista,856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993) (holding that obesity, without being the result of
an underlying physiological disorder enumerated in the relevant state statute, is merely self-imposed
and is insufficient to constitute a disability). Accord Civil Sere. Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281 (P.A. 1991);
Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984). These cases represent the narrowest definition of
"disability" or "handicap," which requires some sort of demonstrable medical impairment. However,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

25

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
Hofstra LaborLav Journal
('Vol. 13:1

to the holding in Cassista:
The result of the holding in Cassista is unreasonable. An employer
who discriminates against an obese employee will have broken the law
if it turns out that the employee also suffers from a disorder listed in
the statute, such as a thyroid problem, even though the employer was
unaware of that condition. However, if it turns out that the employee
does not have one of the listed disorders, the employer may legally
discriminate against the employee on that same basis: obesity. Such a
holding, which distinguishes between actual and perceived disabilities,
"makes no sense... since that interpretation would only protect
against discrimination in cases where the 9 wrongdoer accurately
perceived the discriminatee's 'classification'."' '
Another commentator has recommended that it makes more sense
to include the obese as a class to be protected under civil rights
legislation, rather than to prove that a handicap exists each time an obese
person suffers from employment-related discrimination."g One reason
given for this approach as opposed to changing the definition of
"disability" so as to include obesity is that discrimination based on
obesity will be very fact specific, necessitating "litigation in order to
determine if the obesity was the reason for the employment[-]related
decision."' 93 This position, however, fails to take into account that a
claimant will not have to prove that a handicap exists if obesity is
included in the definition of "disability" or "handicap." Moreover, while
an employment-related decision based on weight may be a very fact
specific determination, it is difficult to comprehend how it will be any
more fact specific than determining whether an individual's race, sex, or
national origin played a part in an employment-related decision.
Yet another commentator has proposed that the obese should be
the mere mention of obesity relating to the "perceived as having a disability" language in an implementing regulation to the ADA can greatly extend its protections to obese individuals. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1994). In this respect, obesity alone would be enough.
191. Dunworth, supra note 45, at 544 (alteration in original) (quoting Gimello, 594 A.2d 264,
277 (citing Poffv. Caro, 549 A.2d 900 (N.L Super. Ct. 1987))).
192. Bierman, supra note 44, at 975.
193. Bierman, supra note 44, at 970-71. The author also suggests that weight-based discrirnination may have a disparate impact on some minorities and on women for equal protection
purposes. Bierman, supra note 44 at 971. For an in depth discussion about the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and weight-based discrimination, see Stolker, supra note 6. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has endorsed the view that congress should extend the Americans with
Disabilities Act to weight-based discrimination. Passagliasupranote 39, at 841. But because there
is no federal law that explicitly prohibits weight-based discrimination, the Commission has argued
that weight programs used by airlines reflect both sex and age bias. Stolker, supra note 6, at 245.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss1/6

26

Garcia: Weight-Based Discrimination and the Americans With Disabilities A
1995]

Weight-Based Discrimination: Is There An End In Sight?

protected by legislation prohibiting "lifestyle" and "appearance"
discrimination.'94 The problem with this-approach is that weight-based
employment decisions can go beyond appearance discrimination in that
an employer may be under the erroneous belief that an overweight
individual will be incapable of performing a job simply because of that
individual's weight, not because of her appearance, or even race. And
if an employer believes that an individual is physically incapable of
performing the job, that individual is being treated as if she was
handicapped, thus, necessitating protection under a disability statute." s
VII.

CONCLUSION

The ADA was enacted to equalize the employment opportunities for
the handicapped by invoking a broad sweep of authority and creating
enforceable standards to eliminate discrimination against the disabled.' 9 6 Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, however, the ADA was meant
to protect a larger group of disabled individuals by being made applicable to the private sector. 9 7 Moreover, by including those that are
regarded as having a disability in the definition of "disability,"'1 9 the
ADA can potentially protect any impaired individual, or anyone perceived to be impaired, who is subject to discrimination in the workplace
on the basis of that impairment.
While the ADA is perhaps the greatest effort to combat discrimination in recent years, it may still be inadequate to eliminate discrimination
against the obese. Unfortunately, the ADA suffers from the same
inadequacies as other previous and current statutory attempts to prohibit
discrimination when dealing withweight-based discrimination. Although
the language is there, neither the ADA nor its accompanying regulations
specifically address the issue of whether obesity is a "handicap" or "dis-

194. Hartnett, supra note 6, at 843.
195. This is not to say that obese individuals do not face appearance discrimination, and
protection for the obese as a class under civil rights or appearance discrimination legislation would
certainly provide extra protection through a second or third cause of action. But see Hartnett, supra
note 6, at 841. The author suggests that it would be a difficult and unfair burden on overweight
individuals to argue that they are handicapped when they do not consider themselves to be. Hartnett,
supra note 6, at 841. Moreover, Hartnett states that an employer's discrimination may be more a
matter of finding an obese individual undesirable as opposed to perceiving her as being disabled or
unfit. Hartnett, supra note 6, at 841.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l)-(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
197. Id. § 1211 1(5)(a). See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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ability" within the meaning of the Act.' 99 The definition of "disability"
must be changed to specifically include the obese so that the Act clearly
protects overweight individuals, and to eliminate the fluctuating
reasoning of our country's courts through a uniform standard."' Without such a change, the most important issue in weight-based discrimination will be left unanswered: whether the perception of having a limiting
condition because of obesity would entitle the obese to protection under
the Act.2 ' Although obesity may not be a "disability" in the ordinary
sense of the word, the legislative history of the Act supports its inclusion:
[The "regarded as having a disability"] prong is particularly important
for individuals with stigmatic conditions that are viewed as physical
impairments but do not in fact result in a substantial limitation of a
major life activity. For example, severe bum victims often face
discrimination .... A person who is excluded from any activity covered
under [the] Act or is otherwise discriminated against because of a covered entity's negative attitudes towards disability is being treated as
having a disability which affects a major life activity... Similarly, if
an employer refuses to hire someone because of a fear of the "negative
reactions" of others to the individual, or because of the employer's
perception that the applicant had a disability which prevented that
person from working, that person would be covered .... 2 2
The regulations accompanying the Act similarly support its inclusion by
defining "regarded as having such an impairment" as: (1) having a
physical impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity
but is treated by an employer as having such a limitation;2 3 (2) having
a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity "only
as a result of the attitudes of others towards such impairment;" 2 4 or (3)
not having one of the enumerated impairments but being treated by a
covered entity as having a "substantially limiting impairment." 2 5 Only
an express prohibition against using weight as a factor in the hiring
process can eliminate the current inadequate standards for determining
whether obese individuals are "handicapped" for anti-discrimination

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Passaglia, supra note 39, at 841.
See supra part IV.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1989).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(I).
Id. § 1630.2(1)(2).
Id. § 1630.20)(3).
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purposes.2 " Without the specific inclusion of obesity in the definition
of "disability," however, weight-based discrimination is sure to continue.
Jeffrey Garcia

206. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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